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Abstract
Iran has been waging a hybrid war against Israel since the Islamic revolution of 1979. In an era when conventional wars have given way 
to a different method, hybrid warfare, the main challenge facing states is how to deal with this new type of security threat. Thus, while 
states have previously faced security threats from regular enemy states’ armies, nowadays hybrid warfare in which non-state actors play a 
key role has become a widespread security threat that requires democratic states to use very different strategies and tactics to overcome it. 
Using securitisation theory, which explores how normal issues transform into security threats, this article analyses how the State of Israel 
has securitised Iranian hybrid warfare which has been mainly executed through its proxy terror organisations of Hezbollah. It does so by 
applying a revised version of the Copenhagen School’s securitisation framework, which focuses on security practices and is underpinned 
by an understanding of security as belonging to a continuum. The proxy terror organisations have moved towards the end point of the 
continuum, which is characterised by survival, existential threats, and militarisation, albeit without completely reaching the end point. 
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The Iran–Israel proxy war is an ongoing conflict between Iran and Israel, emanating from threats and hostility of Iran’s leaders against the state of Israel. It is often also 
bound up in Iran’s stated objective to dissolve the Jewish State, most famously voiced by 
former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who served as the sixth President of Iran from 
2005 to 2013. Ayatollah Khomeini had already previously been critical of Israel before 
he became Iran’s first Supreme Leader after the Islamic Revolution, criticising the Pahlavi 
dynasty’s ties with Israel. Subsequent to the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution, his new 
government quickly became very hostile towards Israel. Iran therefore withdrew recogni-
tion of Israel as a state, which meant that they severed all diplomatic and commercial ties 
with Israel. Since then, Iran subsequently only referred to Israel as the ‘Zionist regime’ 
and ‘occupied Palestine’. On the other side of the equation, Israel’s strongest security 
concern regarding Iran has been its nuclear weapons programme, especially in the light of 
Iran’s allies and proxies, such as Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Israeli Prime Minis-
ter Benjamin Netanyahu therefore aimed to securitise the Iranian nuclear programme on 
several occasions. Clandestine actions were taken by Israel against the Iranian nuclear pro-
gramme from the early 2000s, including the assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists 
and sabotage operations in the nuclear facilities, which eventually led to its delay (Berg-
man, 2018; Katz and Hendel, 2011; Kfir, 2019). In essence, Netanyahu, who returned 
to the post of prime minister in 2009, believed that nuclear facilities in Iran posed an 
existential threat to Israel and should therefore be destroyed (Kfir, 2019; Lupovici, 2016).
Following the deterioration in the relationship between Iran and Israel after 1979, the 
new Iranian regime significantly altered its relationship with Israel and, subsequently, 
started to wage a hybrid war against the Jewish State. In an era when conventional wars 
have given way to a different method, hybrid warfare, the main challenge facing states is 
how to deal with this new type of security threat. Thus, while states have previously faced 
security threats from regular enemy states’ armies, nowadays hybrid warfare in which 
non-state actors play a key role has become a widespread security threat that requires 
democratic states to use very different strategies and tactics to overcome it. 
Using securitisation theory, which explores how normal issues transform into security 
threats, this article analyses how the State of Israel has securitised Iranian hybrid warfare 
which has been mainly executed through its proxy terror organisation of Hezbollah. In or-
der to do so, this article draws upon a revised version of the Copenhagen School’s securitisa-
tion framework. The following section presents this amended version of the securitisation 
framework, which highlights the importance of securitising practices and is underpinned 
by a conceptualisation of security as being located on a continuum. Thus, the section will 
outline the theoretical framework of the article, synthesising from the literatures on hy-
brid warfare and securitisation theory. It is followed by an analysis of the evolution of the 
securitisation practices of Israel against hybrid warfare, outlining the role performed by 
Hezbollah as an Iranian proxy in the hybrid war against Israel and the latter’s securitisation 
of the hybrid warfare by Hezbollah against Israel. The final section will then conclude on 
the empirical material of the article. In essence, this article will shed light on the topic of 
the securitisation of hybrid warfare, notably through practices, one of the greatest security 
challenges of the 21st century, especially for the western democratic world. 
Securitisation and Hybrid Warfare
The core idea of the securitisation framework, which was originally developed by Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan, in cooperation with other colleagues of the so-called ‘Co-
penhagen School’, is that there are no objective security issues that exist ‘out there’ (Buzan 




et al., 1998). There are actually only issues that are socially constructed as security threats 
through processes of ‘securitisation’, which can be defined as ‘processes of constructing a 
shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat’ 
(Buzan et al., 1998, p. 26). In contrast to the realist conceptualisation that perceives 
threats objectively, securitisation theory perceives threats as a social construction on the 
basis of speech act and focuses on the process of how issues intersubjectively transform 
into security threats. Thus, according to securitisation theory, an issue becomes a security 
threat not because it constitutes an objective threat to the referent object, but rather when 
an audience, or several audiences (Leonard and Kaunert, 2011), accepts the securitis-
ing actor’s position that the issue poses an existential threat to the referent object. Their 
conceptualisation of securitisation has a strong linguistic dimension, as they argue that 
security issues are socially constructed as such through ‘speech acts’ (Buzan et al., 1998, 
p. 26; Waever 1995, pp. 54–55). During the securitisation process, the securitising ac-
tor claims that the referent object is existentially threatened, and therefore extraordinary 
measures are justified in order to eliminate the threat (Waever, 2004). Unless the audience 
both agrees with the securitising actor’s claim that the issue is an existential threat to the 
referent object and supports the securitising actor’s suggestion to use extraordinary meas-
ures to deal against it, the issue will not be successfully securitised (Buzan et al., 1998, 
p. 25). While it seems that the move from normal to emergency mode is immediate, in 
most cases, securitisation is in fact a very gradual process and it is very rarely that an issue 
moves directly from normalcy to emergency (Abrahamsen, 2005). In that context, Leon-
ard and Kaunert (2019, p. 23) suggest “not to follow too closely the traditional and nar-
row definition of security as advocated by the Copenhagen School as it may hamper the 
understanding of ‘real life’ security dynamics”. Alternatively, Leonard and Kaunert (2019, 
pp. 24–29) accurately assert that securitisation occurs even when the security issue is 
located at the lower level of the normalcy/existential threat spectrum. Securitisation does 
not, therefore, necessarily incorporate aspects of emergency, exceptionalism, or illegality. 
Moreover, the securitisation framework is underpinned by a ‘traditional military-political 
understanding’ of security (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 21), which equates security with sur-
vival (Leonard and Kaunert, 2019).
Over the years, the securitisation framework has attracted much praise, but has also been 
criticised from various perspectives (Balzacq et al., 2016). In essence, two issues are of 
particular importance for the purpose of this article. The first is the idea that issues cannot 
only be constructed as security issues discursively, but also through practices. The second 
concerns the understanding of security underpinning the securitisation framework. With 
regard to the issues of discourses and practices, the securitisation framework as it was 
originally developed by the Copenhagen School put significant emphasis on the social 
construction of threats through securitising ‘speech acts’. In other words, it highlighted 
the importance of discourse for the social construction of security threats. However, Bigo 
(2000, p. 194) argued that ‘[i]t is possible to securitise certain problems without speech 
or discourse and the military and the police have known that for a long time. The practi-
cal work, discipline and expertise are as important as all forms of discourse’. Likewise, 
Balzacq (2008, p. 75) has claimed that ‘rather than investigating the construction of 
threats at the level of discourse, we should focus on the function and implications of 
policy instruments used to meet a public problem’. Concerning the understanding of 
security underpinning the securitisation framework, this article moves away from the 
Copenhagen School’s narrow understanding of security – which is equated with survival 
and involves existential threat – to adopt a broader understanding of security. From that 
perspective, the ideas of survival and existential threats are not abandoned, but are placed 
at the end of a continuum. As advocated by Abrahamsen (2005, p. 59), security issues 
can be conceptualised as ‘[moving] on a continuum from normalcy to worrisome/trou-
blesome to risk and existential threat – and conversely, from threat to risk and back to 




normalcy’. Thus, existential threats, survival and arguably military practices can be seen 
as characterising the end point of this continuum, whereas the realm of security encom-
passes a broader part of the continuum than merely this end point. 
The phenomenon of hybrid warfare has been debated since it entered into the security 
and military lexicon. On the one hand, as states and non-state actors have employed 
both conventional and irregular methods to achieve their goals throughout history, 
some view hybrid warfare as the latest definition for irregular or asymmetric methods 
used to counter a conventionally superior enemy. On the other hand, others assert 
that the concept of hybrid warfare represents a new type of phenomenon implemented 
by contemporary threat actors (Jasper and Moreland, 2014). According to Hoffman 
(2007), hybrid warfare comprises different types of warfare, which can all be executed 
by both state and non-state actors. These types of warfare include conventional capa-
bilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts, and criminal disorder. By con-
ducting this variety of acts of warfare, Hoffman (2007, p. 8) asserts that the main goal 
of hybrid warfare is to obtain “synergistic effects in the physical and psychological 
dimensions of conflict”. In addition, Hoffman (2007) notes that in hybrid war, all the 
forces, whether they are regular or irregular, become blurred into the same force in the 
same battlespace. Pindjak (2014) contends that Hybrid warfare involves multi-layered 
endeavours that aim to destabilise a functioning state and polarise its society. Thus, by 
combining kinetic operations with subversive efforts, the adversary goal is to have an 
impact on decision-makers. Usually, according to Pindjak (2014), in order to avoid 
attribution or retribution, the aggressor using hybrid warfare conducts clandestine ac-
tions that leave no credible smoking gun. In that sense, Deep (2015) argues that hybrid 
warfare has the “potential to transform the strategic calculations of potential belliger-
ents due to the rise of non-state actors, information technology, and the proliferation 
of advanced weapons systems” (Deep, 2015). With regard to hybrid terrorist organisa-
tions, Ganor (2019, pp. 73–83) asserts that these groups operate in two spheres, the 
pseudo-legitimate sphere of welfare and political activities, and the sphere of violence 
and terrorism. A notable example of hybrid warfare is the case of the Lebanese ter-
ror organisation Hezbollah, which during the Second Lebanon War in summer 2006 
fought a multifaceted campaign against Israel, blending conventional and unconven-
tional methods. Other examples of hybrid warfare campaigns are Russia’s involvement 
in Ukraine and ISIS operations in Syria and Iraq (Bachmann, 2018). 
Given the phenomenon of hybrid warfare poses a substantial challenge to democratic 
states in the current era, not all kinds of hybrid warfare pose an existential threat. 
However, the conundrum is what happens when a situation occurs where hybrid war-
fare poses an existential threat to a sovereign state. How does the threatened state 
respond to that hybrid threat when it poses an existential threat to it? How can the 
decision-making process in the threatened country whose purpose is to confront that 
hybrid threat be analysed? Thus, in order to combine these two elements, hybrid war-
fare and security threats, this article will use securitisation theory, which explores the 
process in which social entities transform normal issues into security threats (Buzan 
et al., 1998, p. 29). While securitisation can assist scholars in analysing the process of 
how an issue transforms into a security threat, notably through practices, as outlined 
above, this article uses securitisation theory in order to explore how the State of Israel 
confronted Iran and Hezbollah’s precision missile project, which has posed a security 
threat for the Jewish State. While other scholars used securitisation theory for analys-
ing how security issues evolve in Israel (Abulof, 2014; Olesker, 2014a, 2014b, 2018; 
Lupovici, 2014, 2016), the Israeli securitisation of Iran and Hezbollah’s precision mis-
sile project can shed light on the topic of the securitisation of hybrid warfare, which 
is one of the greatest security challenges of the 21st century, especially for the western 




democratic world. In the next sections, this article will look at the history of the 
conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, from the establishment of the Shiite organisa-
tion in the 1980s to the Iranian decision after the Second Lebanon War in 2006 to 
significantly upgrade its rocket fire capability in order to threaten strategic targets and 
population centres in Israel.
Hezbollah as an Iranian proxy:  
military practices for Iran
This section examines the evolving security practices of hybrid warfare of Iran against the State of Israel, and the subsequent securitisation of hybrid warfare itself in the 
eyes of the Israeli security echelon. As part of its ongoing struggle against Israel, the Irani-
an strategy uses proxy organisations for two main reasons. First, because of the consider-
able distance between Israel and Iran, over a thousand kilometres, it is an operational dif-
ficulty for Iran to attack Israel. Second, Iran is very concerned about the Israeli response 
if it attacks Israel directly. Therefore, the use of proxy organisations significantly shortens 
the distance from Iran to Israel, effectively creating two fronts of struggle against Israel, 
one in the north against Hezbollah in Lebanon and the other in the south against Hamas 
and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip. In addition, it allows Iran not to be directly involved 
in confrontation with Israel (Eilam, 2019, p. 37). In order to achieve this goal, Iran has 
supported its proxy organisations in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip and provided them 
with various weapons, including rockets and missiles (Bergman, 2018, pp. 568–571). In 
practice, this proxy warfare has become one of the main military practices by which Iran 
threatens the security of the State of Israel, which is of crucial importance in terms of 
Israel’s response, as will be outlined in the next section.
Iran’s most central proxy organisation is Hezbollah, which is based in Lebanon. Hezbol-
lah, Lebanon’s Party of God, is a pan-Shi’a movement and an Iranian proxy group, which 
constitutes the largest militia in Lebanon (Levitt, 2013, p. 8). Since its establishment in 
1982 by Iran, Hezbollah has become the major political factor and the most militarily 
powerful body in Lebanon. In fact, Hezbollah has succeeded in advancing the status of 
the Shiite community in Lebanon, from a persecuted and deprived community to the 
most powerful and dominant community in the country, while repressing the Christian 
community in Lebanon. The Iranians, who sought to instil their religious ideology of the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran and improve the status of the Shiite population in Lebanon, 
poured hundreds of millions of dollars in favour of Hezbollah. Thus, Iran established 
many social institutions for the Shiites in Lebanon, such as hospitals, clinics, universi-
ties, cultural institutions and radio and television stations (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008, 
pp. 52–57). In parallel, Iran has trained and armed Hezbollah operatives and turned 
them into a military militia in the service of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC) (Katz and Hendel, 2011, p. 41). The organisation numbers about 20,000 armed 
men, of whom 5,000 are elite fighters, and between 20,000 and 50,000 are reserve fight-
ers (Eilam, 2016, pp. 51–52). Hezbollah bases its defence on the civilian population in 
which it is located. The organisation establishes its headquarters on the lower floors of 
ten-story residential buildings and hides weapons such as missiles and rockets in residen-
tial buildings. Hezbollah therefore succeeds in deterring Israel from attacking these tar-
gets for fear of harming many civilians, which may provoke sharp international criticism 
of Israel if it decides to attack (Katz and Hendel, 2011, pp. 58–59). Hezbollah’s main 
weapon is its missile arsenal of over 150,000 rockets, reaching a range of up to 300 kilo-
metres, which cover the entire population concentration in Israel (Eilam, 2019, p. 36). 
Yet, despite Hezbollah’s huge stockpile of missiles, which are stored and scattered in 200 
cities and villages all over Lebanon, it is mainly based on non-guided missiles that cannot 
hit a target accurately (Eilam, 2016, pp. 37–42).




Hezbollah began its military operations following the expulsion of Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) forces from Lebanon in 1982 during the First Lebanon War. In-
spired by the religious justification of leading Shiite ideologues such as Iran’s Ayatollah 
Khomeini, Hezbollah carried out suicide bombings against Israeli, American, and French 
targets located in Lebanon including the Israeli military government building in Tyre 
killing 91 people in November 1982, at the American embassy in Beirut in April 1983 
killing 63 people, at the US Marine Corps barracks in Beirut in October 1983 killing 241 
people, at the French army barracks in Beirut killing 58 people, and at the Israel Defence 
Forces (IDF) headquarters in Tyre in November 1983  killing 60 people (Marcus, 2018, 
pp. 40–41; Harel and Issacharoff, 2008, p. 56).
After Israel’s withdrawal to the security zone in June 1985, and until the early 1990s, de-
spite violent clashes between Hezbollah and the IDF, the latter had the upper hand killing 
many Hezbollah militants. However, after Hezbollah fighters were trained by the IRGC 
and acquired guerrilla skills in the early 1990s, the Shiite organisation began to pose a 
significant challenge to Israel in southern Lebanon. The reform of Hezbollah’s military 
capability began during the time of Secretary-General Abbas Mussawi, who was assas-
sinated by Israel in February 1992, and was accelerated even more after the appointment 
of his successor, Hassan Nasrallah. Thus, during the 1990s, the IDF, together with the 
South Lebanon Army (SLA), waged an ongoing war in southern Lebanon against Hez-
bollah, which in turn waged a guerrilla war against the IDF and SLA, fighting that was 
mainly characterised by the laying of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) on the sides of 
the roads where IDF convoys passed and the firing of anti-tank missiles at IDF’s outposts 
(Marcus, 2018, pp. 42–50). Hezbollah’s campaign against Israel was also related to the 
domestic political situation within Lebanon. According to the Taif Agreement signed in 
October 1989 that aimed to end the 14-year-long civil war in Lebanon, it was agreed 
that all militias, including Hezbollah, would be disarmed. Hezbollah, which refused to 
disarm, realised that only continued fighting against Israel would leave the organisation 
legitimised to remain armed. Therefore, the organisation pledged to the Lebanese govern-
ment, which in turn preferred not to confront Hezbollah, that it would use its weapons 
only against Israel (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008, pp. 57–58).
Hezbollah was not content with just firing and fighting against Israeli military targets. 
The organisation also fired rockets at towns and villages in northern Israel near the border 
with Lebanon, mainly on the city of Kiryat Shmona, which is only 3 km from the Israel-
Lebanon border. In order to put a stop to the rockets firing on northern Israel, the IDF 
launched two rounds of fighting against the Shiite organisation: Operation Accountabil-
ity in July 1993 and Operation Grapes of Wrath in April 1996, in which Israeli Air Force 
(IAF) and artillery corps attacked Hezbollah’s targets in Lebanon. In launching both 
operations, Israel opted that its airstrikes in southern Lebanon would lead the Lebanese 
and Syrian governments to pressure Hezbollah to stop firing rockets at Israel. Eventually, 
both military rounds ended without the defeat of Hezbollah, and the parties reached an 
understanding to remove the citizens of the two countries from the fighting circle. In 
fact, while as part of the understanding, the organisation was banned from firing rockets 
at Israel, Hezbollah was given legitimacy to continue operating against IDF soldiers in 
Lebanon. Hezbollah has therefore gained growing sympathy among the Shiite population 
in Lebanon, which sees the Shiite organisation as the only factor that dares to challenge 
Israel’s military superiority in the region (Marcus, 2018, pp. 54–66).
The clashes between the IDF and Hezbollah continued into the second half of the 1990s. 
The number of casualties on the Israeli side, which averaged 25 soldiers killed per year 
(in Hezbollah, the average death toll was double and stood at 50. In total, 256 Israeli sol-
diers and 1248 Hezbollah militants were killed in Lebanon in the years 1982-1999), and 




especially the intense sensitivity of Israeli public opinion to the deaths of soldiers, meant 
that many voices began calling for an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon (Marcus, 2018, pp. 
66–72; Harel and Issacharoff, 2008, pp. 15–23; Rapaport, 2007, pp. 64–67). In May 1999, 
Ehud Barak, who during his election campaign in March 1999 promised that if elected he 
would withdraw the IDF from Lebanon within a year of his election, was elected as Israel’s 
new Prime Minister. Barak, who hoped to reach a peace agreement with Syria in which the 
IDF would withdraw from Lebanon, stated that in any case, the IDF would leave Lebanon 
even as part of a unilateral withdrawal. In that sense, the new Israeli prime minister believed 
that an Israeli presence in southern Lebanon did not serve Israel’s security interests, as it 
provided Hezbollah with a legitimacy to act militarily against Israel. Eventually, after the 
failure of peace talks with Syria in March 2000, Barak decided that Israel would withdraw 
unilaterally from southern Lebanon, despite opposition from top IDF officials who warned 
that Hezbollah would be stationed along the border with Israel. Therefore, after 18 years of 
presence, Israel unilaterally withdrew from Lebanon in May 2000 (Harel and Issacharoff, 
2008, pp. 26–45; Marcus, 2018, pp. 90–91; Rapaport, 2007, pp. 90–91).
Although the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon was perceived as a tremendous achieve-
ment for Hezbollah, which was portrayed as the group that expelled Israel from Lebanon 
through the force of the armed resistance, it removed the organisation’s main grounds for 
continuing its fighting against Israel. In this situation, the Hezbollah leadership feared 
that the organisation would lose its legitimacy to stay armed. Therefore, Hezbollah made 
a new argument to suggest that Israel did not fully complete its withdrawal from Lebanon 
as long as it continued to own the Shebaa Farms, an area located at the foot of Mount 
Hermon and which actually belongs to Syria according to UN maps and not to Leba-
non. Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah stated that as long as Israel did not 
withdraw from the Shebaa farms, his organisation would continue its struggle against 
Israel (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008, pp. 66–67). In October 2000, after less than half a 
year of silence, Hezbollah militants abducted the bodies of three soldiers whose vehicle 
was hit by an explosive device placed by Hezbollah in the Israeli territory of Mount Dov 
near the border with Lebanon. This timing of Hezbollah’s move was inconvenient for 
Israel, due to the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada a week earlier, and therefore 
Jerusalem preferred not to open a second fighting front in Lebanon. Hence, instead of 
reacting harshly to the Hezbollah abduction incident, Israel chose to contain the event 
and responded by only bombing individual Hezbollah targets in Lebanon. Israel actually 
continued in this way until the outbreak of the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 
2006. Whenever Hezbollah created provocations along the border, such as placing ex-
plosive devices and firing anti-tank missiles at IDF outposts, Israel chose to restrain and 
contain the events, which signalled to Hezbollah and Iran that Israel was refraining from 
responding. Ariel Sharon’s tenure as Prime Minister from 2001-2006, who was politically 
remembered as the one who led Israel into the Lebanon War in 1982, a war that left 
Israel in Lebanon until 2000, also added to Israel’s policy of restraint toward Hezbollah. 
Sharon, like his predecessor Barak, preferred not to open a second front in the north that 
would surely lead to Hezbollah rocket fire on northern Israel and to an extensive IDF ac-
tion in Lebanon, while Israel was engaged in fighting Palestinian terrorist organisations in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Even when Sharon chose to respond to Hezbollah provo-
cations, for example when Hezbollah fired massive mortars at Israel in March-April 2002, 
Sharon responded by firing on Syrian radar stations and positions of the Syrian army in 
Lebanon, an operation that was contained by Syria and Hezbollah and did not degenerate 
into widespread conflict (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008, pp. 69–75).
In addition to Israel’s containment policy, the latter has refrained from treating the arma-
ment of Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal, which has been steadily growing since the IDF left 
Lebanon in May 2000. Since then, Hezbollah received a steady supply of rockets from 




Iran and Syria, which increased the organisation’s rocket arsenal from 7,000 rockets in 
2000 to 14,000-20,000 rockets, most of them short-range up to 20 km. Thus, while Hez-
bollah continued to arm itself, Jerusalem preferred to ignore it, assuming that it would be 
enough to use the air force against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Moreover, in the years 2000-
2005, the IDF was mainly occupied in the Palestinian arena and later in the implementa-
tion of the disengagement plan from the Gaza Strip, and therefore the Lebanese arena was 
not on Israel’s top priority list (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008, pp. 77–91).
Hezbollah’s continued activity also provoked criticism in the Lebanese domestic arena, 
with the Lebanese government led by Rafic Hariri expressing displeasure with the or-
ganisation’s continued attacks on Israel at the Shebaa Farms, claiming that they endanger 
Lebanon. Yet, despite harsh criticism of Hezbollah and especially its refusal to disarm 
under the 1989 Taif Agreement and also in accordance with the Security Council Resolu-
tion 1559 of September 2004 calling for the disarmament of all Lebanese militias, the 
Lebanese government refrained from confronting Hezbollah. In response to the criticism, 
Hezbollah claimed that in light of the weakness of the Lebanese army, the organisation 
constituted a buffer between Israel and Lebanon and in fact protected Lebanon from any 
Israeli aggression (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008, pp. 97–105). Another issue on the agenda 
in Lebanon was the release of Lebanese prisoners held by Israel. The 2004 prisoner ex-
change deal with Israel, in which Israel released 430 Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners 
in exchange for the three bodies of soldiers abducted in 2000 and an Israeli citizen ab-
ducted by Hezbollah abroad, was a great achievement for Hezbollah. Therefore, Nasral-
lah continued to declare that his organisation would continue to kidnap Israeli soldiers 
in order to secure the release of additional prisoners. In carrying out further abductions 
that would lead to a prisoner exchange deal with Israel, Nasrallah opted to remove the 
issue of dismantling Hezbollah from its weapons from the public agenda in Lebanon. 
Given Israel’s containment policy in response to Hezbollah’s provocations, an agenda 
that has prevailed in Jerusalem since the IDF withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, Nasrallah 
estimated that Israel would not respond harshly to further abductions and, therefore, the 
price Hezbollah would pay would be minimal. After a failed attempted abduction of an 
IDF soldier in the village of Ghajar in November 2005, Hezbollah succeeded in kidnap-
ping two soldiers (who were apparently dead at the time of the abduction) in July 2006, 
an event that led to the outbreak of the Second Lebanon War (Harel and Issacharoff, 
2008, pp. 108–110; Rapaport, 2007, pp. 86–89).
After refraining from responding to Hezbollah operations and maintaining its contain-
ment policy since withdrawing unilaterally from Lebanon in 2000, Israel decided to re-
spond harshly to the abduction of two IDF soldiers. In response to the abduction, the 
Israeli Air Force destroyed Hezbollah’s medium-range rocket arsenal and bombed civil-
ian infrastructure targets in Lebanon, such as bridges and the Beirut airport runways. 
Furthermore, the Israeli Air Force bombed the Dahiya suburb in south Beirut, which 
was Hezbollah’s nerve centre in the Lebanese capital. In fact, the IDF offered a tougher 
response in the form of bombing vital infrastructure facilities in Lebanon, such as power 
plants, but the Israeli government led by Ehud Olmert refused, claiming that this would 
harm the pro-Western Lebanese government headed by Fouad Siniora and increase Hez-
bollah’s popularity among the Lebanese public. In response to the Israeli bombings, Hez-
bollah fired short-range rockets at northern Israel. Hezbollah, which was confident that 
the incident would end within 48 hours and did not assume for a moment that Israel 
would respond severely to the abduction, was astonished by the intensity of the Israeli 
response. Nasrallah, for his part, admitted that if he had known that Israel would react 
as he did, he would not have ordered the abduction that led to the outbreak of the war. 
Despite the massive Israeli response, Hezbollah’s rocket fire did not cease, which led to 
Hezbollah’s conscious victory over Israel in that the organisation continues to stand on its 




own two feet and does not capitulate. Hezbollah has realised that as long as they continue 
to kill Israeli soldiers in Lebanon and continue firing rockets at Israel, which damages 
morale among the Israeli population, they are winning the battle for consciousness. In 
practice, Israel did not have an appropriate response to the continued short-range rocket 
fire by Hezbollah that hit cities in northern Israel, including Haifa, Acre, Nahariyya and 
Safed, causing casualties and extensive damage to buildings. Given that a massive ground 
operation could have brought an end to the rocket fire on Israel, Israel opted to avoid it 
for fear of casualties. Alternatively, the IDF chose to rely mainly on air force bombings, 
which in turn did not lead to the cessation of Hezbollah rocket fire at Israel. Eventually, 
the casualties among IDF soldiers and the continued firing of rockets at Israel led to great 
disappointment among the political echelon and the Israeli public with the IDF perfor-
mance in Lebanon and to an anxiety regarding further losses in battle. After more than a 
month of fighting, in which about 4,000 rockets were fired at Israel and 161 Israelis (119 
soldiers and 42 civilians) and a thousand Lebanese (half of them civilians) were killed, 
a ceasefire was reached (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008, pp. 145–265; Olmert, 2018, pp. 
693–729). While the Second Lebanon War was the last time a round of fighting took 
place between Israel and Hezbollah, the Lebanese organisation has worked since then 
with Iran’s assistance to increase its rocket arsenal and especially to improve its accuracy. 
This section outlined the security practices of hybrid warfare of Iran against of Israel, 
notably through its proxy organisation Hezbollah. This proxy warfare has become one, 
if not, the, main military practice by which Iran fights with Israel, and, thus, has deter-
mined the course of Israel’s response to it. Given the long distance between Israel and 
Iran, a direct military attack on Israel does not seem feasible, and retribution very likely. 
Using proxy organisations, Iran effectively creates two fronts against Israel. Thus, Iran has 
supported its proxy organisations in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. The next section will 
discuss how Israel securitized Iran and Hezbollah’s precision missile project, which has 
posed a security threat for the Jewish State. It arrived on Israel’s security agenda through 
the IDF’s Military Intelligence practices, and was subsequently accepted by the Israeli 
Cabinet and the military echelon. The next section will outline this in more detail.
Israel’s securitisation of Iran and Hezbollah’s  
precision missile project 
This article suggests that issues cannot only be constructed as security issues discur-sively, but also through practices, as outlined in the theoretical section. Further-
more, to comprehend the security underpinning the securitisation framework, this article 
moves away from the Copenhagen School’s narrow understanding of security – which is 
equated with survival and involves existential threat – to adopt a broader understanding 
of security. This is vital for an application of hybrid warfare, which does not predomi-
nantly involve existential security threats. Ideas of survival and existential threats are not 
abandoned, but are placed at the end of a continuum, whereby hybrid warfare represents 
a large range before the reaching of the end point of this continuum. 
The Lebanon War revealed to Israel the depth of Iranian involvement, both in financing 
and training of Hezbollah forces (Katz and Hendel, 2011, p. 55). In fact, the Second Leba-
non War and Hezbollah’s alleged victory encouraged Iran to further arm its proxy organisa-
tion in Lebanon (Eilam, 2016, pp. 37–38). According to the head of the Israel Defence 
Intelligence Analysis Division, Brigadier General Dror Shalom, the main Iranian goal has 
been to arm Hezbollah with precision missiles and rockets that could hit strategic targets in 
the State of Israel (KAN, 2020b). Thus, while there are many types of hybrid warfare waged 
by Iran against Israel, such as terrorist acts and cyber-attacks, the Hezbollah missile accuracy 
project being built by Iran is Israel’s main hybrid warfare security threat. 




While as of 2019, Hezbollah holds 150,000 rockets, the option under which these mis-
siles will be converted into precision-capable missiles will be a change in the balance of 
power between Israel and the Iranian proxy Hezbollah. During the Second Lebanon War 
in the summer of 2006, 4,000 rockets were fired at Israel by Hezbollah from Lebanon, 
hitting mainly populated areas in the north of the country. However, the firing of Hez-
bollah rockets at Israel during the war was not effective in terms of accuracy and damage. 
Therefore, as Brigadier General Dror Shalom explains, in order to strengthen Hezbollah’s 
military capability, the Iranians decided to develop missiles and rockets with a precision 
level of ten metres and hand them over to Hezbollah. Because of these capabilities, Iran, 
through Hezbollah, will be able to accurately hit vital targets in Israel such as power 
plants, government facilities and IDF bases (KAN, 2020b).
According to Amnon Sofrin, former head of the Israeli Mossad’s intelligence department, 
the man behind the precision missile project was the commander of the Quds Force 
of IRGC, General Qasem Soleimani, who was assassinated in January 2020 in Iraq by 
the United States. In fact, until his assassination, Soleimani was the mastermind and 
operative of Iran’s policy of aggression in the Middle East, which supported its proxy 
organisations based outside Iran (KAN, 2020a). Al Quds Force was established in the 
early 1990s to allow the Iranian regime to operate covertly outside Iran’s borders. The 
goal was to build an operational mechanism that would bring the Islamic Revolution out 
of Iran (Katz and Hendel, 2011, p. 243). According to Col. G, the head of the Lebanese 
arena in the Israeli Military Intelligence, Soleimani had two main goals in developing 
the precision missile project. The first was to reduce the firing range for Israel. While 
the distance between Iran and Israel is thousands of kilometres, southern Lebanon is 
located about a few hundred kilometres from the nerve centre of the State of Israel in Tel 
Aviv and Gush Dan. Therefore, while Iran needs to launch longer-range missiles to hit 
Israel, Hezbollah can achieve the same goal from Lebanon with shorter-range rockets. 
Soleimani’s second goal was to remove the battlefield from Iran. Given firing at Israel 
from Syria and Lebanon will lead to an Israeli response against these countries, rather 
than against Iran, which in turn will remain unharmed, it is better for Tehran to fund 
its proxy organisations and arm them so that they will be at the forefront of the struggle 
against Israel (KAN, 2020b). According to the head of the IDF’s Operations Division, 
Major General Aharon Haliva, a situation in which Hezbollah will have accurate missile 
and rocket capability is a security threat to the State of Israel, a threat that is second 
in severity after the Iranian nuclear threat. If Iran’s proxy organisations achieve these 
capabilities, the balance of power in the region will change significantly to the detriment 
of Israel, whose population will be exposed to accurate rocket and missile fire. Therefore, 
to prevent this kind of scenario, it was decided in Israel to securitise Iran and Hezbollah’s 
precision missile project (KAN, 2020b).
The fight against the Iranian precision project is part of Israel’s overall strategy known 
as the “Campaign between the Wars (CBW)”. According to Brigadier General Dror 
Shalom, the main idea behind the CBW is to offset the enemy’s capabilities without 
reaching war, and to use this period to build Israel’s power and weaken its foes, so 
that if a war does erupt, Israel will face it with greater force than its adversaries (KAN, 
2020b). In addition to Israel, there has also been great concern in the United States 
regarding the development of Iran’s missile capabilities. According to former U.S. 
Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta, arms shipments from Iran to Hezbollah and the 
aid Tehran provided to terrorist groups across the region were directed by Soleimani. 
The purpose of the latter, according to former head of the CIA David Petraeus was to 
establish the Shiite crescent (Iran, Iraq, Syria, and southern Lebanon) and especially 
to establish a land communication line from Iran through Iraq, Syria and south to 
southern Lebanon (KAN, 2020b). 




The topic of the precision missile threat to Israel began to evolve on Israel’s security agenda 
in early 2013, when officers from the technology arena in the IDF’s Military Intelligence 
introduced the danger of the Iranian precision project to the then head of Israel Defence 
Intelligence Analysis Division, Brigadier General Itai Brun. According to Brun, this 
was the first time a serious discussion had taken place on the significance of the Iranian 
precision project and what the consequences would be for Israel in the event that Iran 
transferred to Hezbollah an accurate missile attack capability. After the Israeli Cabinet 
and the military echelon realised that the Iranian missile accuracy project posed a security 
threat to Israel, the question was how to confront it. One of the main considerations in 
the course of action against the precision project was how not to embarrass the other side 
and allow it to contain the Israeli preventive attack, and therefore preventing the outbreak 
of a comprehensive war in the Middle East (KAN, 2020b). In terms of securitisation 
theory, the conundrum was what extraordinary measures should be taken in order to 
overcome the threat. 
Eventually, in 2013, following the decision of the political echelon headed by Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Chief of Staff Benny Gantz placed the responsibility 
for handling the precision project on the IAF, which in turn began to act against the 
Iranian arms shipments arriving in Syria and from there to Lebanon to Hezbollah. 
According to Amir Eshel, the commander of the IAF at that time, the IAF bombed 
convoys of trucks loaded with missiles at the beginning of the process (KAN, 2020b). 
Then, in addition to six attacks executed during 2013 against arms shipments destined 
for Hezbollah from Syria, one of the attacks attributed to Israel took place in February 
2014, in which the IAF bombed a convoy of trucks carrying Syrian surface-to-surface 
missiles (Haaretz, 2014). However, according to Eshel, after the missile shipments were 
discovered and destroyed from the air, the Iranians began to disguise the shipments and 
move missile components inside suitcases. Damascus Airport was therefore the gateway 
for weapons to Syria and from there to Hezbollah, and Israel successfully targeted 
this path of weapon smuggling too (KAN, 2020b). In essence, Israel attacked arms 
shipments from Syria to Lebanon at least 100 times until 2017 (Eilam, 2019, pp. 56–
57). After the Iranians realised that whenever a shipment arrived in Damascus it was 
intercepted by Israel, they decided to transfer the shipments to an airport in northern 
Syria, but even there the long arms of the IDF managed to reach and destroy the 
components transferred by the Iranians. Therefore, Iran and Hezbollah have decided 
to set up their own facilities in Syria where they can continue to develop the missile 
precision project. The site chosen for this activity was the CERS Centre in the Hama 
district in central Syria where the Assad regime produces missiles and other weapons. 
Eventually, the facility was bombed by Israel in September 2017 (KAN, 2020b; Eilam, 
2019, pp. 58–59; Ynet, 2017).
In response to the destruction of the facility in Syria, Iran and Hezbollah decided to 
move the missile production project from Syria to Lebanon, assuming that Israel would 
refrain from attacking Lebanon. According to Col. G, with the help of the Iranians who 
provided the knowledge, Hezbollah began converting the inaccurate projectiles in its 
possession into GPS-guided missiles with a precision capability of ten metres. To disguise 
the operation and make it difficult for Israel to destroy the facilities where the rockets 
were converted, Hezbollah chose to carry out the missile precision project in the heart of 
a civilian neighbourhoods such as in Beirut, in the basements under the Beirut football 
stadium, and at Beirut International Airport. Due to the desire to avoid harming the 
civilian population, Israel chose to publicly expose those rocket conversion sites, which 
led to their closure by Hezbollah (KAN, 2020b; Times of Israel, 2018; Haaretz, 2018; 
Ynet, 2019b). Yet, in other cases, Israel chose to attack targets in the Lebanese capital. 
Thus, in August 2019, as part of thwarting the missile precision project of Hezbollah and 




Iran, Israel also used assault drones to bomb Hezbollah buildings in the Dahieh suburb of 
Beirut where rocket conversion components for precision missiles were stored, including 
a planetary mixer manufactured in Iran (KAN, 2020b; Ynet, 2019a).
This section has examined the Israeli response to the evolving security practices of 
hybrid warfare of Iran against Israel. Securitisation and its emphasis on practices has 
helped to analyse the process of how hybrid warfare transformed into a security threat, 
and was accepted as such by the Israeli security echelon. This section contributed 
to our understanding of the Israeli securitisation of Iran and Hezbollah’s precision 
missile project, and, more broadly, the securitisation of hybrid warfare by Iran. 
The section identified the precision missile threat to Israel, which was securitised 
through the IDF’s Military Intelligence practices, and, subsequently, accepted by the 
Israeli Cabinet and the military echelon. Israel responded to this with extraordinary 
measures, such as the bombing of convoys of trucks loaded with missiles and arms 
shipments from Syria to Lebanon. The section, thus, underlined the hybrid nature of 
the warfare between Iran and Israel and the social processes that explain the events in 
this conflictual relationship.
Conclusion
This article set out to investigate the evolving security practices of hybrid warfare of Iran against the State of Israel, and, the subsequent securitisation of hybrid warfare 
itself in the eyes of the Israeli security echelon. Securitisation helps to analyse the process 
of how hybrid warfare transforms into a security threat, notably through aforementioned 
military security practices, as outlined above. This article utilised securitisation theory in 
order to analyse how the State of Israel confronted Iran and Hezbollah’s precision missile 
project, which posed a significant security threat for the Jewish State. In addition, the 
article further contributed to previous work whereby other scholars used securitisation 
theory for analysing how security issues evolve in Israel (Abulof, 2014; Olesker, 2014a, 
2014b, 2018; Lupovici, 2014, 2016). Yet, the Israeli securitisation of Iran and Hezbol-
lah’s precision missile project has shed light on the topic of the securitisation of hybrid 
warfare, arguably one of the greatest security challenges of the 21st century, especially for 
the western democratic world. It did so by applying a revised version of the Copenhagen 
School’s securitisation framework, which focuses on security practices and is underpinned 
by an understanding of security as belonging to a continuum, rather than being equated 
with survival and existential threats. 
The article analyses the precision missile threat to Israel, which began to evolve on Israel’s 
security agenda in early 2013 through the IDF’s Military Intelligence practices. The ac-
ceptance of this security threat by the Israeli Cabinet and the military echelon led to 
several extraordinary measures being taken in order to overcome the threat. Firstly, Israel 
bombed convoys of trucks loaded with missiles and attacked arms shipments from Syria 
to Lebanon. However, after Iran and Hezbollah set up their own facilities in Syria for 
the development of the missile precision project, the CERS Centre in the Hama district 
in central Syria, the facility was subsequently bombed by Israel. Moving the missile pro-
duction project from Syria to Lebanon, Hezbollah converted inaccurate projectiles into 
GPS-guided missiles with precision capability. In some cases, Israel, in response, publicly 
exposed those rocket conversion sites, while in other cases, it attacked relevant targets. 
Thus, in August 2019, Israel used assault drones to bomb Hezbollah buildings. The anal-
ysis of the more recent security practices illustrates that this crisis led to an intensification 
of the Israeli security practices against Iran and Hezbollah. It therefore moved towards 
the end point of the continuum, which is characterised by survival, existential threats, 
and militarisation. Yet, the article also showed the full range of securitisation practices in 




the hybrid warfare against Iran. This article has therefore shed light on the topic of the 
securitisation of hybrid warfare, notably through practices, which is one of the greatest 
security challenges of the 21st century, especially for the western democratic world. 
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